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VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS AND THE DISTRIBUTION
PROCESS: A PRACTICAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS
AND THE RULE OF REASON AFTER SYLVANIA
The Sherman Antitrust Act' was passed at a time when giant trusts
were monopolizing major portions of the United States economy. 2 The
passage of the Act reflected a social decision that competitive market
processes should operate freely and without restraint to achieve the de-
sired goals of the consuming public. 3 Although the original thrust of the
Act was aimed at obvious monopolizing practices, anti-competitive tech-
niques in today's society have become much more subtle and more diffi-
cult to define. Not only have antitrust laws continued to direct their
attention toward monopolies and attempts to monopolize, they have also
attempted to prohibit a wide range of restraints placed upon competition
through agreements or contractual arrangements which are inconsistent
with modern social values. Recently, challenges to the effects of vertical
restrictions 4 placed by manufacturers upon their distribution processes in
attempts to stimulate the sale of their products have embroiled the prac-
ticing attorney and the economist alike in a continuing controversy over
the effects that such restraints have upon competition,5 and over the judi-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
2. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law. 1887-1890, 23 CHI. L. REV. 221
(1956).
3. The ultimate aims of antitrust policy can be broken down into four broad classes:
the attainment of desirable economic performances; the achievement and maintenance of
competitive process in the marketplace; the prescription of a standard of business conduct,
that is, a code of fair competition; and the prevention of undue growth of big business. C.
KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 11-20 (1959). "The Sherman Act was
designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained
interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources,
the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same
time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political
and social institutions." Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).
"[W]e cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protec-
tion of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional
higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and
markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization. We
must give effect to that decision." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
4. Vertical restrictions are those imposed upon or by persons at different levels of the
market. These must be distinguished from horizontal restrictions that operate among
competitors at the same level of the market. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No.
2, VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND COMPETITION 2 (1977).
5. The major controversy surrounds the effects such restraints have upon intrabrand
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cial rules for analyzing these restraints.6 The purpose of this comment
will be to review vertical restrictions and their effects upon competition,
the changes that recent decisions will have upon the method of analysis
and the areas within which practitioners should be knowledgeable in or-
der to analyze business decisions that could result in antitrust violations.
Economic Background7
Antitrust laws and economic analysis are inextricably tied together,
not only in examining the particular restraint in question, but also in
evaluating how well the antitrust laws have served society's perceived
goals. One major social goal advanced by antitrust law is the mainte-
nance of a competitive economy.8 To understand the forces that affect
the economy, economists have developed various models 9 to reflect what
they believe happens in the marketplace. Although the theories devel-
oped from these models are useful as a starting point, the practitioner
should remember that economic realities rarely involve such easy deter-
minations as the ideal models portray. However, the attorney must be
able to understand and apply these basic economic theories.
Economists believe that the unfettered operation of the market sys-
tem will decide what goods will be produced, how scarce resources will
be allocated among those goods, and for whom the various goods will be
produced.' 0 The underlying proposition of the market system is that the
consumer will decide what and how much will be produced, and that
competition among manufacturers will determine who will produce it. I I
and interbrand competition. For a further discussion of the effects, see notes 70-83, infra
and accompanying text.
6. The two major methods of analysis developed by the courts are the per se and rule
of reason tests. For a further discussion of these methods, see notes 47-57, infra, and
accompanying text.
7. See generally, P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS (7th ed. 1967); L. SULLIVAN,
ANTITRUST LAW (1977).
8. Competition operates to keep private markets working in ways which are socially
acceptable. Under ideal conditions, private markets would encourage efficient resource
allocation, stimulate the use of efficient methods of production and distribution, and en-
courage a progressive technology and high productivity. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 21.
See note 3, supra.
9. The models are analyzed under ideal conditions by making certain basic assump-
tions and by holding all variables constant except the ones to be tested. P. SAMUELSON,
supra note 7, at 68-70.
10. See generally E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND EcONoMIcs 41 (1976); P.
SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 15-16.
11. E. GELLHORN, supra note 10, at 41.
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Assumptions involving the concepts of scarcity 12 and basic price theory' 3
reflect that resources are not unlimited, that they must be allocated
among the various production possibilities, and that prices are the coor-
dinating mechanism for the market, because every good, resource, or
service, has a price.' 4 The price of an individual product is determined
by the interaction of supply and demand: how much will be demanded' 5
and how much will be willingly supplied 16 at a given price. If all other
factors remain constant, an equilibrium price' 7 can be established. If
the price is too low or too high, forces within the market will bring it
back to the equilibrium point. '8 In this sense, supply and demand in the
marketplace determine the price of the product.
The behavior of markets cannot properly be analyzed without an
explanation of the behavior of consumers and business firms within the
market, because their behavior is important in understanding the
12. The law of scarcity recognizes the fact that there are not enough resources to pro-
duce everything in unlimited amounts. Therefore, a decision must be made as to what
kind and what amounts of goods will be produced, and what will not be produced. E.
GELLHORN, supra note 10, at 44; P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 16.
13. Price theory is the concept that the pricing mechanism, working through supply
and demand in the competitive market, will answer the questions of what kinds of, how
many and for whom products will be developed, produced, and distributed. E. GELL-
HORN, supra note 10, at 45; P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 42.
14. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 42.
15. The demand schedule reflects the relationship between the market price of a good,
and the quantity demanded of that good by consumers. The quantity demanded varies
inversely with the price. With other variables held constant, this would mean that the
higher the price charged for a good, the less quantity people will be willing to buy. E.
GELLHORN, supra note 10, at 59; P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 59-60.
16. The supply schedule reflects the relationship between the market price of a good,
and the amounts of that good that producers are willing to supply. The quantity supplied
varies directly with the price. Again holding other variables constant, the higher the price
of a good, the more goods producers will be willing to supply. E. GELLHORN, supra note
10, at 60; P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 61.
17. See note 18, infra.
18. When the supply and demand schedules are combined, an equilibrium price is
reached. This is the only price where the amount willingly supplied equals the amount
willingly demanded. If the price is above the equilibrium price, more will be supplied
than demanded. As stocks of merchandise build up, some sellers will be willing to undercut
the going price, thus the price will fall, but it will not be reduced to zero. If the price of the
product falls below the equilibrium price, more will be demanded than supplied. The
consumers will bid more for the amount available, thus the price will rise. At any price
other than the equilibrium point, forces within the market (assuming that consumers and
suppliers will act according to the underlying assumptions) will bring the price back to the




problems of resource allocation. 19 Basic to this analysis is that each
consumer has many tastes and desires for a wide variety of services and
products. Economists proceed under the assumption that the consumer
will attempt to maximize his needs and desires in terms of his available
income. As a function of the total dollar amount available, the con-
sumer will buy a mixture of goods and services that maximizes his mar-
ginal utility.20 This does not mean that if a particular product increases
in price, the consumer will do without it, for he may be willing to have
less of one type of good to obtain more of another. However, as the
price of that good continues to rise, at some point the consumer will
demand less of that good or will substitute a comparable item for it.2'
On the suppliers/producers side, economists proceed under the as-
sumption that a firm will usually seek to maximize its profits.22 Nor-
mally, profits are determined through the interaction of the firm's costs
of production and the price at which the finished product can be sold.
Here, costs of production include not only the raw materials, overhead
and administration costs, and costs of distribution, but also a normal
return of profit. The more efficiently the firm produces the product, the
better profit margin it can expect. 23 To maximize this profit, the firm
19. Here, the objective of antitrust law in assuring a competitive economy is based
upon the belief that through competition, consumer wants will be satisfied at the lowest
price with the sacrifice of the least amount of scarce resources. E. GELLHORN, supra note
10, at 41-51.
20. Various concepts have been developed to explain the law of downward-sloping
demand. Marginal utility is the amount of additional utility provided by an additional
unit of economic good or service. The concept of diminishing marginal utility demonstrates
the consumer's tendency to maximize his total utility for all goods where there is equality
of each and every good's marginal utility per dollar. Total utility rises with each new
marginal addition of a good but at a decreasing rate of growth. With equal additions to a
good's quantity, its marginal utility tends to decrease. To get the most total utility, the
consumer must achieve a fundamental marginal condition for demand equilibrium: A con-
sumer has not maximized his well-being until he has succeeded in making equal the respec-
tive marginal utilities per dollar spent on each and every good. P. SAMUELSON, supra note
7, at 417-24, 427-28.
21. The explanation of the downward-sloping demand curve can also be broken down
into its substitution-effect and income-effect components without resorting to the marginal
utility concept. The substitution effect occurs when the price of the good rises while other
prices of goods remain the same. At some point, the consumer will substitute relatively
cheaper products. The income effect takes place when a consumer has a fixed income and
the price of a good increases. If the consumer continues to buy the good, this results in a
decrease in his real income. With a lower real income, he will now want to buy less of that
good. Id.
22. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 517-22.
23. Such factors are explained by the economic theory of production. Producers want
to have efficient production because this will usually mean higher profits. With the price
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will continue to produce as long as the last item produced will increase
the firm's profits.
In addition to analyzing the process of establishing the market price,
economists further extend their examinations into the areas of perform-
ance, conduct, and structure of the overall marketplace 24 to explain the
interaction of these basic elements within the market and the orderly
market behavior brought about by competition. 25 This type of analysis
provides useful concepts and analytical techniques for determining
whether competition is present and whether certain kinds of market
structures or conduct are consistent with the overall objective of main-
taining competition.2 6 Perhaps the most important area for the practi-
tioner to understand is the market structure, 27 which encompasses
market characteristics and organization. The more common models in-
clude pure competition,28 oligopoly, 2 9 monopolistic competition,30 and
stable at the equilibrium point in the supply and demand schedules, greater efficiency
means less costs. The gap between costs and price will widen as long as the firm keeps
becoming more efficient. The firm will make profits as long as its marginal revenue ex-
ceeds its marginal cost. This result exists where the last item of production brings in more
funds than it cost to be made. Id.
24. Micro-economics deals with these terms in a subdivision called industrial organi-
zation. Market performance deals with such questions as the relationship between costs
and prices, price elasticities of demand and supply, whether there are adequate resources
available for production, and whether technology is efficient and progressive. How the
firm responds to various stimuli in the marketplace, is called the firm's market conduct.
Market structure describes the way the market is organized and the basic characteristics
each type of market possesses. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 22.
25. E. GELLHORN, supra note 10, at 76.
26. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 20. See note 3, supra.
27. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 24.
28. Pure competition is characterized by a large number of buyers and sellers, none of
whom can affect the market price of the product by varying the quantity demanded or
supplied. Other characteristics include a homogeneous product; perfect information about
the prices and nature of the goods sold; and complete freedom of entry into the market.
Since no single firm can affect the price, all are price takers and can control only their
output and efficiency of operation to increase their profits. The firm will produce until its
marginal cost equals the market price. This maximizes consumer satisfaction by using
resources in the most efficient manner. See generally E. GELLHORN, supra note 10, at 79-
87; P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 467; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 25.
29. The oligopoly market structure is characterized by a few sellers with a somewhat
differentiated product. Rather than acting alone and not being able to affect the market
price, each firm considers the reaction of the others in the market before making its own
output and pricing decisions. With just a few firms, if one firm raised its prices and the
others retained the old price, consumers would switch to a comparable, but lower priced
good. Therefore, the firm would have to lower its prices to regain its relative position.
Although a firm which lowered its prices might sell more for a short term, the others would
also lower their prices and the relative market shares would remain the same. Oligopolists
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monopoly.3' Under the assumption that firms will seek to maximize
their profits, 32 the ideal situation from the firm's viewpoint would be the
monopoly position, for this structure produces supra-normal profits. 33
However, the most socially desirable position is that of pure competi-
tion,34 which permits only normal profits. This basic conflict between
the goals of businessmen and society in general was the motivating cause
in the development of antitrust laws, for society quickly learned that busi-
nessmen, left unsupervised, would not be content to let the free opera-
tion of the marketplace determine their profit margins. The antitrust
laws themselves are legislative acknowledgements that competition
within the marketplace was not working because of the restraints placed
upon it.
Antitrust Law
The fundamental premise underlying antitrust law is that "competi-
tion," which the antitrust laws are designed to promote and protect, is
realize that they are interdependent upon each other and that only through concerted ac-
tion can they receive higher than normal profits. See generally E. GELLHORN, supra note
10, at 102-08; P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 469; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 26.
30. The monopolistic competition model is an attempt to reconcile the difference be-
tween the two extremes of competition and monopoly. Whereas in the pure competition
model there is a homogenous product, and in the monopoly model there is a unique prod-
uct, monopolistic competition is based upon each firm having a similar product, but each
product being differentiated through various sales techniques. The many sellers do not
engage in price competition, but compete vigorously in non-price competition. While such
efforts eliminate the supra-normal profits of each firm, the price remains the same to con-
sumers. See generally E. GELLHORN, supra note 10, at 98-102; P. SAMUELSON, supra note
7 at 469.
31. The monopoly market structure is characterized by a single seller; a unique prod-
uct; substantial barriers to entry; and imperfect market knowledge. Whereas the firm in
the pure competition situation takes the price as given, the monopolist considers the market
price in determining his output, because he can set the market price. The pure competition
firm will produce until its marginal cost equals the market price; the monopolist will pro-
duce until his marginal cost equals his marginal revenue. The price at such output will be
above that in a competitive situation, producing supra-normal profits for the monopolist.
See generally E. GELLHORN, supra note 10, at 87-93; P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 468-
69; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 25-26.
32. See note 23, supra, and accompanying text.
33. To be able to demand higher prices, the firm must have some amount of market
power. Whether a seller possesses such power depends upon the reaction of buyers to
price changes. Buyer reaction, in turn, will depend upon the availability of substitutes.
Monopoly power not only allows the firm to control prices in the market, but also includes
the ability to exclude competition by creating barriers to entry. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 7,
at 30-33.
34. See note 3, supra.
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equivalent to the "free market"-the unrestrained rivalry of independent
business concerns.35 Competition "without restraint" implies the ab-
sence not only of anti-competitive actions by firms, whether acting alone
or in concert, but also of intrusive actions by government agencies.
Maintaining an economy capable of functioning effectively without cre-
ating an abundance of supervisory political control is therefore the
goal. 36 A properly operating market would thus achieve both social37
and political objectives. 38 While pure competition would seem to be the
ideal structure for the attainment of these goals, competition in a pure
form rarely, if ever, exists. The question thus becomes to what extent
the market can deviate from the ideal and still achieve the desired objec-
tives.
In response to public dissatisfaction with the economic power at-
tained by certain firms and combinations of firms in the late 1880's, Con-
gress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act. 39 Although the Act was aimed
at the obvious anti-competitive effects of monopolies and attempts to
monopolize 4° prevalent at that time, it also contained a broad provision
that made a wide variety of activities to restrain competition illegal.
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 provides:
Every contract, combination,. . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce; . . . is hereby declared to be illegal .... 41
From such relatively simple language has sprouted a multitude of legal
and doctrinal opinions concerning the meaning and the proper scope of
review that should be applied in determining which action is a "restraint
35. Blake & Jones, In Defense ofAntitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 377, 381-84 (1965).
36. Id. The purpose of the Sherman Act is to insure the "unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces" which will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the low-
est prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress while at the same time
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and
social institutions." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
37. The major social objectives include efficient allocation of resources, maximum
consumer satisfaction and minimum maldistribution of wealth. Blake & Jones, supra note
35, at 381-84. See note 3, supra.
38. The major political objectives include avoiding governmental management of pri-
vately owned enterprises; avoiding concentration of economic power in the hands of a few;
and enlargement of individual liberty. Blake & Jones, supra note 35, at 381-84.
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
40. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize. . . any part of the
trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). This language of the Sherman Act has been interpreted as
establishing the "rule of reason as the prevailing standard of analysis." Continental T.V.,




Justice Peckham in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass n4 3
read the statute literally and insisted that the Act outlawed every re-
straint, regardless of its reasonableness. On the other hand, Justice
White, writing for the majority in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v.
United States" and United States v. American Tobacco Co. ,45 advocated
the position that only such restraints which unreasonably affected com-
merce were unlawful. Under this view even a significant restraint of
trade would not violate the Act if it could be shown to have redeeming
features that would outweigh the injury to competition. 46 The prevail-
ing position today, one generally developed along the lines of Justice
White's viewpoint, is that
the Sherman Act bans all concerted arrangements which are
adopted for the purpose of reducing competition, or which, regard-
less of purpose, have a significant tendency to reduce competition,
but that arrangements which are adopted for and tend to achieve
other purposes do not fall within the condemnation of the Act
merely because of some incidental and inconsequential restraining
effect on competition.47
In evaluating a restraint upon competition, two basic methods of
analysis have developed. The rule of reason test, generally attributed to
Justice White,48 in essence provides that only those restraints which are
unreasonably anti-competitive or which significantly restrict competition
are illegal49 under the Sherman Act. The rule of reason and the factors
to be considered in using this method were perhaps best explained by
42. The Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52 (1911),
has indicated three principal concerns that the court should look to in determining whether
a particular restraint impairs competition. These are: "(1) The power ... to fix the price
and thereby to injure the public, (2) [The power to impose some]. . . limitation on produc-
tion; and (3) The danger of deterioration in quality. . . which. . . [is] the inevitable resul-
tant of the monopolistic control over. . . [an article's] production and sale." See generally
MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 26.
43. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
44. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
45. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
46. For a good review of the historical basis of this area, see generally Bork, The Rule
af Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 1), 74 YALE L.J.
775, 785-805 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Bork I].
47. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 166.
48. But see Bork I, supra note 46, at 785. Professor Bork believes that a careful read-
ing of Justice Peckham's opinions would reveal that the honor of establishing the rule of
reason belongs to him.
49. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 186-87. Under this rule, the fact-finder weighs all
the circumstances of a case to decide whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited for
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Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States:50
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined
by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To
bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and per-
haps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business
to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, ac-
tual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because
a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or
the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to
interpret facts and to predict consequences. 5'
This statement of the rule is exceedingly general and does not afford the
practitioner any degree of certainty about the objective factors to be con-
sidered in determining the "purpose" of the restraint, the "facts peculiar
to the business," the "effects" of the restraint, or the competing "condi-
tions" of the industry. However, Chicago Board of Trade does provide a
general framework which includes such inquiries as:
1. Identify specifically the practice involved.
2. Determine the purpose of the restraint.
3. Identify the effects of the practice.
4. Determine whether, on balance, the restriction imposed
substantially impedes competition.5 2
As a result of the complexity and uncertainty in analyzing massive
amounts of economic data, and as an attempt to balance the competitive
and anti-competitive effects of the restraints, a second rule of analysis
was developed. The per se rule recognizes that some restraints, because
of their proven anti-competitive effect, are unlawful as a matter of law.
As classically stated by Justice Black in United States v. Northern Paci/ic
Railway:53
imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylva-
nia Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2557 (1977).
50. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
51. Id. at 238.
52. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 187-88.
53. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
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[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or
the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se unreason-
ableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed
by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone con-
cerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated
and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the
industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to deter-
mine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasona-
ble-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.5 4
The per se rule would thus foreclose any further inquiry into the reason-
ableness of the restraint or practice once it is established that:
1. The practice if effective is likely in the great generality of cases
to cause substantial injury to competition; and
2. An inquiry into whether the practice in this instance is injurious
to competition would be complex, time consuming, costly and,
in the end, uncertain. 55
Basically, the per se method represents a value judgment by the
courts that the anti-competitive effects of the particular practice in ques-
tion outweigh its purported justifications. 56 Due to the severity of at-
taching a per se label to a particular restriction, "[i]t is only after
considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts
classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act."'57 While over the
years the courts have declared a number of practices between competi-
tors to be per se violations,58 the area of vertical restrictions in the distri-
54. Id. at 5.
55. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 193.
56. Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions.- White Motor and Its
Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1420 (1968). Recently the Court noted that, "Per se
rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the social utility of partic-
ular commercial practices. The probability that anti-competitive consequences will result
from a practice and the severity of those consequences must be balanced against its pro-
competitive consequences. Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise, but a per se
rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to jus-
tify the time and expense necessary to identify them. Once established, per se rules tend to
provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the burdens on litigants and
the judicial system of the more complex rule of reason trial." Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2558 n.16 (1977).
57. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972).
58. Horizontal Price Fixing Arrangements: Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil. Co., 310 U.S. 150
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bution process has not been so clear cut.
Distribution Arrangements
When the production processes are completed, the finished product
is ready for distribution to the consuming public. Distribution systems,
in addition to performing other economic functions,5 9 provide the deliv-
ery mechanism for effecting the physical transportation of the product
from the manufacturer to the purchaser, and to be successful, necessarily
involve certain basic requirements. 60 The distribution systems available
to the manufacturer range from dealings with independent distributors
to the manufacturer's personal operation of the entire marketing process.
However, not all options are open to every manufacturer. Since every
system will incur costs in the performance of its functions, the availabil-
ity of capital, managerial control, cost efficiencies, and the product's ba-
sic character interact to determine the best distribution system for each
manufacturer.
The basic character of the product, 61 whether it is deemed a conven-
ience62 or shopping good,63 will determine whether the manufacturer
(1940). Vertical Price Fixing: United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Division of Markets:
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. Addys-
ton Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Group Boycotts: Klor's v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312
U.S. 457 (1941).
59. Professor Strasser has identified the economic functions of a distribution system as
including: (1) Delivery-includes the buying, selling, transporting, and other logistical op-
erations; (2) Sorting-the matching of consumer preferences to a particular quality-product
mix; (3) Services-includes pre-sale and post-sale repair; (4) Risk Taking and Insur-
ance--risk that the products won't be sold and insuring the goods while moving through
the system; and (5) Management Information-information for those in authority to make
price and other marketing decisions. Strasser, Vertical TerritorialRestraints After Sylvania.
A Policy Analysis and Proposed New Rule, 1977 DUKE L.J. 775, 785-86.
60. The most important requirement is that it function as a coordinated system rather
than as a group of independent businesses. Other requirements include the ability to solve
intra-channel conflicts, the necessity of some sort of channel leadership, and the retention
of flexibility to meet dynamic market situations. Id. at 786-88.
61. See Note, Restricted Channels ofDistribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 795 (1962).
62. Convenience goods are usually relatively low-priced impulse goods and are gener-
ally sufficiently standardized for the customer to accept another brand if the one he prefers
is not in stock. Therefore, greater exposure of the product increases the likelihood of more
numerous sales. Id.
63. Shopping goods are relatively expensive items and the purchaser is usually willing
to shop around and compare prices and brands. He will sometimes travel a considerable
distance before making his decision. Id.
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wants an intensive64 or selective distribution.65 Given the type of good,
the method best suited for that good, and the relative market, the distri-
bution system chosen by the manufacturer depends upon a comparison
of the relative operating costs of such a self-operated system with the cost
of using independent distributors.
Another important consideration in the selection process is that of
control.66 Until the product is ready for distribution, the manufacturer
exercises exclusive control over every decision affecting it. The degree
of control he retains also depends upon the distribution method. This
ingredient must be viewed against the background of the economic
processes for determining price,67 because the degree of control the man-
ufacturer retains increases the expenses of the distribution system. To
maintain absolute control over the price and the number of resale sales
outlets, the m'nufacturer would have to operate a complete vertically
integrated system for merchandising the product. At the other extreme,
a manufacturer may exercise no control by selling to independent dis-
tributors, thus allowing them to set prices and locations for resale. Re-
strictive distribution arrangements are intermediate forms of vertical
market control 68 which allow manufacturers to maintain some control
over certain managerial decisions affecting the product while relinquish-
ing control over others.69 Through a wide variety of contractually ar-
64. Intensive distribution involves attempting to place the produce in as many retail
outlets as possible. However, the cost of distribution increases with the number of outlets.
Id.
65. A manufacturer who uses selective distribution limits the number of outlets for his
product which in turn decreases the costs of distribution. The most extreme form of selec-
tive distribution involves the use of exclusive territories. Although selective distribution
tends to lower costs of distribution, it normally tends to restrict or eliminate competition
among the various sellers of the manufacturer's products. This reduction of intrabrand
competition is one of the major areas of concern for the opponents of vertical restrictions
under the antitrust laws. Id.
66. See Comment, The Impact of the Schwinn Case on Territorial Restrictions, 46 TEX.
L. REv. 497 (1968).
67. See notes 13-18, supra, and accompanying text.
68. See Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements. Economic Analysis and Public
Policy Standards, 30 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 506 (1965).
69. One commentator in discussing why a supplier would prefer a restrictive arrange-
ment to the complete control of a distribution outlet through vertical integration, found
three characteristics of distribution arrangements of paramount importance: (1) that distri-
bution is a relatively low-profit activity; (2) that distribution is typically a multiproduct
activity, with the product mix of distributors substantially different from that of any one
supplier; and (3) that the local managerial problems and personal service content of distri-
bution discourage suppliers from integrating forward when other alternatives are available.
Preston, supra note 68, at 512.
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ranged vertical restrictions and the business relationships70 within which
they are used, manufacturers have sought the advantages of vertical inte-
gration without the accompanying disadvantages of the capital expendi-
ture and costs associated with operating the vertical system.
Vertical Restrictions
Although the antitrust laws have not often been applied to extreme
arrangements of independent dealings and vertical integration,71 they
have been concerned with vertically restrictive distribution arrangements
and the possible adverse effects such restrictions could have upon com-
petition. The economic justifications for a particular type of restraint in
such a vertical situation and the economic effect that restraint has upon
intrabrand72 and interbrand 73 competition are varied. Although econo-
mists and commentators alike have extensively analyzed and debated the
reasons and effects of the restraints and the applicable standard for eval-
uating them, very little agreement has resulted.74
70. Many of the business relationships in which such restrictions are used are fre-
quently referred to by the term "franchise." The Ad Hoe Committee on Franchising iden-
tified three distinct types of franchises: (1) Those that are primarily concerned with an
effective method of distributing the franchisor's products, ine., automobiles, bicycles; (2)
Those that establish retail outlets where the franchisor is principally selling a name and
method or format of doing business, ie., restaurants, motels, and serving organizations;
and (3) Those that establish manufacturing or processing plants, ie., soft drink field, mat-
tress manufacturing. MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 1 n.2. Although franchising may take
many different forms, most franchise arrangements share four characteristics: (1) the fran-
chisee is an economically dependent but legally independent member of the system; (2) the
franchise business is operated with the name and standardization advantages extended by
the franchisor; (3) the franchisee's business came into being to sell the franchisor's product
or service; and (4) there is typically a formal agreement and continuing relationship be-
tween the parties. Strasser, supra note 59 at 790. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note
7, at 399-401.
71. This is assuming that the independent dealings are a result of arms length bargain-
ing. If otherwise, then there would be a concern. Also, if the manufacturer had a monop-
oly, it would be subject to antitrust scrutiny.
72. Intrabrand competition occurs between different manufacturers or sellers of the
same brand of product.
73. Interbrand competition exists among different manufacturers or sellers of different
brands of products.
74. See Bork I, supra note 46, at 775; Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Con-
cept." Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 337, 430-51, 465-73 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Bork II]; Preston, supra note 68, at 511. But see Comanor, supra note
56; Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court.'An Analysis of the Restricted Distribu-
tion, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 283-
85 (1975). See generally MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 37-42.
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General explanations for the manufacturer's behavior in restricting
competition among his distributors include his desire to increase the
amount of nonprice competition to stimulate the provision of point-of-
sales services,75 and his belief that the restraint will increase net revenues
by increasing efficiency.76 Frequently cited justifications77 for the re-
strictions include the desire to obtain market access/dealer investment, 78
to eliminate the "free-rider" problem, 79 to increase distributors' sales ef-
forts,80 and to determine quality and character of dealer services.81 Pro-
75. Posner, supra note 74, at 283. Professor Posner explains that point-of-sales serv-
ices can be stimulated by setting a minimum retail price but not restraining nonprice com-
petition. Dealers will then increase nonprice competition in an effort to engross as much
as possible of the difference between the retail price and the cost of distribution, ie., their
profit margin. Dealers will continue spending more on nonprice competition until the
marginal cost of distribution has risen to meet the resale price. When that point is
reached, the retailers will not be receiving any monopoly profits; instead they will be fur-
nishing the level of services desired by the manufacturer. As an alternative to retail price
fixing, granting exclusive sales territories while enacting a dealer commitment to provide
the desired point-of-sales service would reach the same result. Id. at 283-85. It must be
noted that this method only eliminates the monopoly profits among the dealers. It does
not help the consumer because he is still paying for the product at the monopoly price.
76. Bork II, supra note 74, at 403. The Court in Sylvania specifically approved the
achievement of certain efficiencies in the distribution as promoting interbrand competition.
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 97 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (1977).
77. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 411-21; Comanor, supra note 56, at
1428-35; Preston, supra note 68, at 511; Strasser, supra note 59, at 794-830.
78. Preston, supra note 68, at 511. Contra, Comanor, supra note 56, at 1428-35.
With certain restrictions, the manufacturer might obtain access to markets that would
otherwise be closed to him. This argument proceeds under the theory that distributors
would be unwilling to handle a manufacturer's product unless they were afforded some
protection against ruinous intrabrand competition. Dealers could justifiably believe that
in the absence of vertical restrictions, "cutthroat" intrabrand competition from other deal-
ers would drive down prices, render their operations unprofitable, and thus endanger their
capital investment. GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1003 n.37
(9th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
79. Preston, supra note 59, at 511. Contra, Comanor, supra note 56, at 1428-35.
Under the "free rider" theory, vertical restrictions are necessary to prevent dealers from
invading the territories of other dealers by choosing to rely on the promotional efforts of
those other dealers rather than undertaking costly selling activities themselves. It is argued
that without such restrictions, dealers will not provide advertising or repair facilities as
extensively as they would if assured that invading dealers will not pirate the benefits of
these promotional activities. GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980,
1003 n.37 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
80. Preston, supra note 68, at 511. It is argued that vertical restrictions encourage
total sales effort on a dealer's part by facilitating more concentrated and intense coverage
of each geographic market, thus leading to increased sales of the manufacturer's products.
Sales to large customers located close to the dealer cost less than sales to smaller, more
distant customers. The manufacturer benefits if all customers are charged an identical
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portents of vertical restrictions also argue that they actually increase
overall competition by promoting interbrand competition more than
they reduce intrabrand competition. 82  Opponents counter with the ar-
gument that restraints on the freedom of distributors to sell their prod-
ucts are on their face violations of the antitrust laws.8 3 Vertical
restrictions are criticized not only for eliminating intrabrand competition
but also, through their effect upon product differentiation, for limiting
interbrand competition.8 4  Moreover, some commentators consider the
economic effects of vertical territorial and customer restraints to be simi-
lar to those of horizontal market division and vertical price fixing. 85
As a result of this debate over the effects that such vertical restric-
tions have upon competition, two different schools of economic thought
have developed.86 On the one side, Professor Comanor argues that ver-
tical restrictions lead to a serious misallocation of resources 87 and that
consumers should be the ones to decide what goods will be sold and
what services will be provided by dealers.88 On the other side, Professor
Bork argues that the manufacturer should decide how his product is dis-
tributed and that vertical restrictions are a source of efficiency them-
selves8 9 and do not misallocate resources.9 0
price and the dealer's savings from sales to the choice customers offset the higher costs
incurred in sales to others. Vertical territorial restrictions are thus often designed to moti-
vate dealers to increase their depth of coverage in narrowly defined areas rather than
"skimming" choice customers over a wider area. GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V.,
Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1003 n.37 (9th Cir. 1976) (en bane).
81. The fourth justification for the legality of vertical restrictions is that they are nec-
essary incentives to motivate dealers to provide a high quality and character of dealer
services such as consumer credit, prompt and efficient repairs, and other post-sale services.
The theory is that dealers can be persuaded, and are willing, to provide these better services
in exchange for some insulation from ruinous intrabrand competition. GTE Sylvania Inc.
v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1003 n.37 (9th Cir. 1976) (en bane).
82. MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 40. Vertical restrictions reduce intrabrand compe-
tition by limiting the number of sellers of a particular product competing for the business
of a given group of buyers. The ability of retailers to exploit this market may be limited by
the ability of the consumer to travel to other locations, and to purchase competing prod-
ucts. However, these factors are not affected by the form of the transaction between the
manufacturer and the retailer. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549,
2560 (1977).
83. MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 35.
84. Comanor, supra note 56, at 1427.
85. MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 43-47.
86. See Note, Territorial Restrictions and Per Se Rules-4 Re-evaluation of the
Schwinn and Sealy Doctrines, 70 MICH. L. REV. 616, 636-37 (1972).
87. Comanor, supra note 56, at 1427-32.
88. Id. at 1423-25.
89. Bork II, supra note 74, at 403.
Although abstract conjecture and debate over the issues can be use-
ful in pointing out the problem areas, the effect that any particular ar-
rangement has in a given context cannot be assessed in advance.91
Undoubtedly some vertical restrictions increase a firm's efficiency while
others enhance a firm's market power.92 Although each situation is
different, vertically imposed restraints have generally been considered to
fall within three broad categories: 93 territorial 94 and customer sales re-
strictions;95 location restrictions;96 and vertical price fixing.97 While it
can be shown that all of these restraints can affect intrabrand and inter-
brand competition, the effects are distinguishable. Location restrictions,
90. Id. at 397-405.
91. "[Elach case arising under the Sherman Act must be determined upon the particu-
lar facts disclosed by the record, and . . . the opinions in those cases must be read in the
light of their facts and of a clear recognition of the essential differences in the facts of those
cases, and in the facts of any new case to which the rule of earlier decisions is to be ap-
plied." Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 79
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
92. E. GELLHORN, supra note 10, at 252.
93. For a thorough analysis of the entire area of vertical restrictions, see generally
MONOGRAPH, supra note 4. See also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 399-431; Preston,
supra note 68, at 507-08.
94. Territorial sales restrictions limit a distributor/seller to selling to customers within
a defined geographic area. See Note, The Impact of the Schwimn Case on Territorial
Restrictions, 46 TEX. L. REV. 497 (1968). See generaly MONOGRAPH, supra note 4. A
typical territorial restriction clause reads:
Distributor is hereby granted the exclusive right . . . to sell during the life of this
agreement in the territory described below ....
Distributor agrees to develop the aforementioned territory to the satisfaction of the
Company,. . . and not to sell such [products] except to individuals, firms, or corpora-
tions having a place of business and/or purchasing headquarters in said territory.
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 255-56 (1962).
95. A customer sales restriction prevents a distributor from selling to certain custom-
ers regardless of where the customers are located. MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 4 n.9. A
typical clause reads:
Distributor further agrees not to sell nor to authorize his dealers to sell such [products]
to any Federal or State government or any department or political subdivision thereof
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 256 (1962).
96. Location restrictions establish the physical site of the distributor's place of busi-
ness at which it may manufacture or from which it may sell the products or at which it may
operate a business under the name, method or format of the manufacturer. A location
clause operates to restrict the freedom of action of the distributor. MONOGRAPH, supra note
4, at 3 n.5.
97. Vertical price restrictions limit distributors in their choice of prices at which they
can resell the products. Economists have generally been critical of resale price mainte-
nance and its anti-competitive effects. Preston, supra note 68, at 407. Seegeneralo MONO-
GRAPH, supra note 4, at 71-96.
1978] COMMENTS 1037
LOUISIANA L4W REVIEW[
including location clauses,98 areas of primary responsibility,99 and profit
pass-over arrangements, °00 restrict intrabrand competition, but do not
theoretically foreclose such competition,' 0 ' while territorial and cus-
tomer sales restrictions intend to foreclose intrabrand competition en-
tirely. 10 2 Both location and territorial/customer restraints to some
extent limit intrabrand price and nonprice competition.'0 3 However,
price fixing, commonly known as resale price maintenance, not only
eliminates intrabrand price competition, but also prevents distributors
from responding to interbrand price competition.'*
In the past, restrictions involving price fixing, whether vertical or
horizontal, have been consistently recognized as having obvious anti-
competitive effects and have uniformly been held to be per se viola-
tions'0 5 of the Sherman Act. However, other types of vertical restraints
have not been viewed so consistently. As with most allegations brought
under the Sherman Act, vertical restraints were initially viewed under a
rule of reason approach. The application of this rule by the courts has
not been satisfactory, for with few exceptions, the courts have not identi-
fied adequate economic criteria for evaluating the restraints.10 6 Most
cases have cited Justice Brandeis' expression of the rule of reason,
0 7
reviewed the purpose of the restraint and the general economic facts of
the industry, and then drawn conclusions about the relative effects of the
restrictions in dampening intrabrand competition while promoting inter-
98. See note 96, supra.
99. A distributor given a primary responsibility area promises to devote its best efforts
to promote and market the manufacturer's product within a designated area. Under this
type of clause, a distributor can sell outside its area, and other sellers can sell inside its area.
L. SULLIVAN, upra note 7, at 496-97; MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 3 n.6.
100. Distributors involved in profit pass-over agreements who make sales to customers
outside their assigned area must provide certain compensation to the distributor in whose
territory the customer was located. The compensation is to reimburse the other distributor
for its promotion and sales efforts, and for providing servicing, for otherwise the distributor
would obtain a "free ride." MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 4 n.7.




105. "The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination
of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not,
involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. ...
Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unrea-
sonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry." United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927). See authorities cited in note 58, supra.
106. MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 54.
107. See text at note 51, supra.
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brand competition. ' 0 8 The courts have not usually considered such fac-
tors as market power, 109 product differentiation, 10 or structural' I' and
behavioral" 2 characteristics which indicate the presence or absence of
competition.
Although specific criteria have not been sufficiently developed in
vertical situations, parameters have been placed upon the scope of the
rule of reason inquiry by the doctrine of ancillary restraints." 3 Here,
courts must "consider whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair
protection to the interests of the party in favor of whom it is given, and
not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public."'" 4 More
often than not, antitrust cases in this area have not focused upon the
economic effects of such restrictions under either test, but have judged
the legality of vertical restraints under rules governing similar conditions
in a horizontal context.'" 5 Since most of the same restrictions would be
per se violations if imposed by competitors in the same level of the mar-
ketplace," 6 there is a definite tendency to view the restrictions in a verti-
cal context in the same manner. This should not be the controlling
factor, however, because an assessment of vertical restrictions must in-
108. MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 54.
109. Market power is the power of a firm to affect the price which will prevail on the
market. L. SULLrVAN, supra note 7, at 30-33.
110. The attempt by the manufacturer to create a real or fancied difference between
similar products through styling, packaging, advertising, service or other nonprice competi-
tion is termed product differentiation. A correlation clearly exists between the extent to
which the product has been differentiated, and the extent a firm can raise its prices above
that of its competitors and still retain a substantial share of the market. The greater the
product differentiation, the smaller the degree to which interbrand competition will be ef-
fective. See generally Comanor, supra note 56, at 1423-25; Note, Restricted Channels of
Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L. REv. 795, 832-33 (1962); MONOGRAPH,
supra note 4, at 64-67.
111. See notes 27-3 1, supra, and accompanying text.
112. Behavioral indicators are used to measure product differentiation. Perhaps the
most important guide to the extent of product differentiation is the cross-elasticity of de-
mand. This is the degree of responsiveness in the sales of one product to price changes of
other similar products. MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 65.
113. "The doctrine of ancillary restraints ...permits, as reasonable, a restraint which
(1) is reasonably necessary to the legitimate primary purpose of the arrangement, and of no
broader scope than reasonably necessary; (2) does not unreasonably affect competition in
the market place; and (3) is not imposed by a party or parties with monopoly power."
United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See
generally Bork II, supra note 74, at 377-90.
114. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898), affd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
115. E. GELLHORN, supra note 10, at 252-53.
116. See authorities cited in note 58, supra.
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volve an economic analysis of their effects in respect to intrabrand versus
interbrand competition. Evaluating the same restraint in a horizontal
context would only involve the determination of its effects in relation to
competitors, or interbrand competition. When economists cannot agree
on the effects of vertical restrictions, it is hard to understand how such
restraints are deemed to have the requisite "pernicious effect" ' 17 and
complete "lack of any redeeming virtue"'" 8 to be declared per se illegal
if courts classify a particular practice as a per se violation of the antitrust
laws "only after considerable experience."' 19 As will be seen from the
development of the case law, the Supreme Court has been laboring
under a similar confusion concerning the proper manner for reviewing
vertical restraints.
Development of the Law
From the time the Sherman Act was passed until the early 1940's,
vertically restrictive distribution arrangements were not seriously chal-
lenged and were uniformly upheld.' 20 However, in 1948 the Depart-
ment of Justice, relying primarily upon the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 21 took the position that
vertical territorial and customer restrictions which totally foreclosed in-
trabrand competition were per se illegal.' 22 A dearth of higher court
adjudications continued to plague this area for the next fifteen years.
Although the government did bring a number of cases attacking such
restrictions, the cases all ended in consent decrees and provided little
guidance.'2 3 This implies that businessmen, at least during this period
of time, believed that the per se test applied to vertical restrictions.
A. White Motor
It was not until 1961 that a firm refused to accept the government's
contentions that its vertical restrictions were per se illegal and chose to
litigate the case. The government, in United States v. White Motor
Co.,1 24 contended that White Motor's method of franchising its distribu-
117. See note 54, supra, and accompanying text.
118. Id.
119. See note 57, supra, and accompanying text.
120. MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 6-7.
121. 321 U.S. 707, 721 (1944) (vertical territorial restrictions were unlawful per se if
they were accompanied by, or an integral part of, an agreement to fix prices).
122. MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 7.
123. For a list of the citations to the 16 consent decrees, see Stewart, Franchise or Pro-
tected Territory Distribution, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 447, 470 n.51 (1963).
124. 372 U.S. 253 (1962).
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tors and dealers constituted per se violations of sections 1 and 3 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. White's franchise contracts restricted resales by
both distributors and dealers to designated geographic areas, restricted
resale customers, and fixed resale prices for trucks and parts. 125 At that
time White Motor was the leading manufacturer of trucks and truck
parts, but it was neither the dominant firm in the automotive industry,
nor was it a newcomer.' 26 Rejecting the contentions of White that it
should be allowed to present evidence at trial concerning the reasonable-
ness of its franchise contracts, the district court granted summary judg-
ment for the government.'
27
The Supreme Court reversed,' 28 finding that summary judgment
was inappropriate for vertical restrictions.' 29 The Court specifically re-
jected the invitation to apply a per se test, citing a lack of knowledge of
the impact of such restrictions upon competition,' 30 but did not, on the
other hand, specifically adopt a rule of reason approach. The Court
simply stated that it did "not know enough of the economic and business
stuff out of which these arrangements emerge to be certain"' 3' of their
effects. In addition, the Court refused to express an opinion upon the
legality of territorial and customer restrictions until after a trial upon the
merits,' 3 2 saying:
[t]his is the first case involving a territorial restriction in a vertical
arrangement; and we know too little of the actual impact of both
125. White, in arguing for a trial of the case on the merits, alleged that the territorial
clause was necessary for its distributors to compete with other competitors; that it could
theoretically have its own retail outlets but that method was not feasible; that the only
feasible method was a distributor or dealer system; for that system to be effective a distribu-
tor must make vigorous and intensive efforts and that if he was to be held responsible for
such performance, it was fair and reasonable to protect him against invasion of his territory
by other distributors; and that in order to obtain maximum sales, White had to ensure that
its distributors concentrate on taking sales away from other competing truck manufactur-
ers, rather than from each other. 372 U.S. at 256.
126. At that time White Motor was among the 100 largest industrial firms in the United
States. Although it was the leading firm in truck production with its principal competitors
being Mack Truck and International Harvester, it also competed with and was substan-
tially smaller than General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. Preston, supra note 68, at 524.
127. United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
128. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1962).
129. The court accepted the contention that summary judgment was appropriate for
price fixing. Id. at 264.
130. Id. at 263. The majority did not distinguish between vertical "territorial" and
"customer" restrictions. However, a concurring opinion of Justice Brennan did attempt
such an analysis. Id. at 264-75.
131. Id. at 263.
132. Id. at 264.
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that restriction and the one respecting customers to reach a conclu-
sion on the bare bones of the documentary evidence before us. 133
Further guidance from the case is nonexistent, for upon remand a con-
sent decree 134 was entered. While the Court did not express a definite
preference for either test, both the majority opinion and Justice Bren-
nan's concurrence can be read to imply a rule of reason approach.' 35
Apparently the lower federal courts read the opinion as adopting that
view, for during the next four years, in the two cases concerning the le-
gality of vertical restrictions, 136 the courts of appeals rejected the per se
rule against vertical restrictions and applied the rule of reason test.' 37
B. Schwinn
The second case concerning the legality of vertical sales restrictions
to reach the Supreme Court was United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co. 138 Schwinn was a family-owned business which for many years
had manufactured and sold bicycles. While in 1951 Schwinn had the
largest single share (22.5%) of the bicycle market, by 1961 its share had
declined to 12.8%. During this period, in an attempt to reduce its costs
of distribution, to avoid haphazard methods of selling, and to streamline
its advertising and marketing efforts, Schwinn elected to implement a
method of selective distribution by franchising its distributors and retail-
ers.139 Schwinn's principal methods of selling its bicycles were through
sales to distributors, sales to retailers through consignment or agency ar-
rangements with distributors, and sales to retailers under the "Schwinn-
Plan." 40 As an integral part of the franchise agreements, Schwinn as-
signed distributors a specific geographic area in which they had the ex-
133. Id. at 261.
134. United States v. White Motor Co., 1964 Trade Cas. No. 71,195 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
135. The majority noted that the restrictions might be allowable against agressive com-
petitors or if they were the only practicable means a small company had for breaking into
or staying in business. Justice Brennan specifically noted several justifications for vertical
restrictions. Both opinions imply a rule of reason approach since allowing justifications is
inconsistent with the per se test. 372 U.S. at 263, 268-72.
136. Sandura Co. v. F.T.C., 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-on Tools Corp. v.
F.T.C., 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
137. Sandura Co. v. F.T.C., 339 F.2d 847, 858 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-on Tools Corp. v.
F.T.C., 321 F.2d 825, 831-33 (7th Cir. 1963).
138. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
139. For an excellent review of the reasons and manner in which Schwinn selected its
distribution system, see Keck, The Schwinn Case, 23 Bus. Lawyer 669 (1968).
140. The Schwinn Plan involved direct shipment by Schwinn to the retailer with
Schwinn invoicing the dealers, extending credit and paying a commission to the distributor
taking the order. 388 U.S. at 370.
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clusive right to supply franchised retailers. Sales to the public were
made only through franchised retailers who were authorized to sell only
from specified locations. Franchised distributors were limited to sales
only to franchised retailers in their territory and franchised retailers
could only sell to customers not to unfranchised retailers.' 4 1
In the district court,142 the government contended that Schwinn's
franchise agreements amounted to an overall conspiracy to fix prices, to
allocate exclusive territories, and to limit sales to selected customers.
Relying upon United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co.,143 the government
alleged that such nonprice restrictions constituted per se violations under
section 1 of the Sherman Act since they were a part of a scheme for
fixing retail prices. After a lengthy trial of seventy days in which the
restrictions' economic effects upon the market, interbrand competition,
and the distribution programs and practices were extensively presented,
the district court rejected the charge of price-fixing, but held that territo-
rial restrictions were unlawful per se in products sold by Schwinn to its
distributors.
Upon appeal, 144 the government urged that the district court's in-
junction should not be confined to sale transactions, but should also in-
clude consignments, agency, and Schwinn-Plan transactions. The
government also urged that restrictions limiting the customers to whom
the distributors and retailers could supply and resell should also be en-
joined. Before the Supreme Court, the government abandoned its con-
tentions that vertical territorial and customer restrictions were per se
illegal and instead urged that a rule of reason be applied.' 45 The
Supreme Court did not completely agree with the government, although
it did modify the district court's decree. Generally, the Court agreed
with the district court that a distinction had to be made between sales
and consignment/agency situations. The Court applied a rule of reason
approach to those vertical territorial and customer restrictions where
Schwinn retained all indicia of ownership and the distributors/retailers
acted as Schwinn's agents or consignees. On the other hand, the Court
found illegal those territorial and customer restrictions imposed by
141. Id. at 370-71.
142. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. I11. 1965).
143. 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
144. Schwinn did not appeal the order prohibiting restraints on resale by distributors
who purchased products from Schwinn. The United States did not appeal the court's re-
jection of its price-fixing charge. 388 U.S. at 368. Since the issue of the lawfulness of
vertical sale restrictions was not appealed, it was not before the Court and any reference to
it was technically dictum.
145. 388 U.S. at 368.
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Schwinn upon its distributors/retailers for those products purchased
from Schwinn. Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, based this deci-
sion upon the "ancient rule against restraints on alienation."' 146 He
stated that "once the manufacturer had parted with title and risk. . . his
effort thereafter to restrict territory or persons to whom the product may
be transferred . . . is a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act."' 47
Schwinn has become one of the most highly criticized antitrust cases
in recent times.148 Criticism has generally revolved around the use of
the per se test developed from a small portion of the language of the
opinion, and its primary reliance upon the "ancient rule against re-
straints on alienation."'149 Another criticism is that the Court had before
it all the necessary ingredients to analyze and establish economic criteria
for evaluating such restrictions, something it had lacked in White
Motor.' 50 The government had even cooperated by inviting the Court
to confine its attention to the intrabrand effects of the restrictions, con-
ceding that the restrictions did not place any restraints upon interbrand
competition. Nevertheless, for unstated reasons the Court failed to dis-
cuss or to distinguish the economic effects' 5 ' although the opinion began
in a manner greatly reminiscent of a rule of reason approach. The
Court initially acknowledged the government's abandonment of its per
se contention' 52 and stated it "must look to the specifics of the chal-
lenged practices and their impact upon the marketplace in order to make
a judgment as to whether the restraint is or is not 'reasonable' in the
special sense in which § 1 of the Sherman Act must be read for purposes
of this inquiry."'
5 3
The shift to a per se test was abrupt and was essentially without
explanation 5 4 other than references to and agreement with the district
146. Id. at 380.
147. Id. at 382.
148. For a collection of articles both pro and con of Schwinn, see GTE Sylvania, Inc. v.
Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 988 n.13 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
149. But see L. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 405.
150. See notes 128-30, supra, and accompanying text.
151. The Court did not distinguish among the challenged restrictions on the basis of
their individual potential for intrabrand harm or interbrand benefit. Instead, the pivotal
factor in the Court's decision was the passage of title. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Syl-
vania Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2556 (1977).
152. 388 U.S. at 368. The government's abandonment of the per se allegations could
be read as being influenced by the Snap-on Tools and Sandura cases' determinations that
vertical restrictions should be analyzed under a rule of reason approach.
153. Id. at 374.
154. As the Court in Sylvania noted, the Court in Schwinn announced its sweeping per
se rule without even a reference to Northern Pac. Ry. and with no explanation of its sudden
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court's ruling and the government's contentions. 155 In what was later
referred to as the "bright line"' 156 per se rule of illegality for vertical
restrictions, Justice Fortas stated that "under the Sherman Act it is un-
reasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and con-
fine areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the
manufacturer has parted with dominion over it.' 157 Although this ap-
proach would seem fairly straightforward, ambiguity was created when
the court used the phrase "without more" and preceded the promulga-
tion of the rule with an extensive discussion that resembled a rule of
reason approach. If the Court had intended to apply a strict per se test,
both the phrase and the discussion would have been irrelevant to such
analysis. 158
The equivocal language of the opinion created a considerable differ-
ence of opinion in the lower courts over whether Schwinn established a
broad per se rule invalidating all territorial and customer restrictions in
sale, as opposed to consignment, transactions.' 59 Although Justice For-
tas clearly stated that the Court was not considering all vertically im-
posed territorial restrictions as coming within the rule, 160 he did not
provide any guidance for future determinations other than the distinc-
tion between sales and consignments. Since future applications of the
Schwinn rule were not resolved, a number of exceptions and justifica-
tions have been claimed. These claims have been based upon the "firm
and resolute"'16' language in the district court's findings, the "new en-
trant" or "failing company"' 62 exception, health and safety justifica-
change in position. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2555
(1977).
155. 388 U.S. at 374-79.
156. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
157. 388 U.S. at 379 (emphasis added).
158. See text accompanying notes 53-57, supra.
159. MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 13-14.
160. The Court stated that they were "not prepared to introduce the inflexibility which
a per se rule might bring if it were applied to prohibit all vertical restrictions of territory
and all franchising." 388 U.S. at 379.
161. The Supreme Court noted that the district court had found that Schwinn had been
"firm and resolute" in the enforcement of the restrictions. Id. at 372. Some lower courts
have required this to be proven before applying a per se test. See, e.g., Reed Bros. v.
Monsanto Co., 525 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 1055 (1976); World of
Sleep, Inc. v. Stearns & Foster Co., 525 F.2d 40 (10th Cir. 1975); Good Inv. Promotions,
Inc. v. Coming Glass Works, 493 F.2d 891, 893 (6th Cir. 1974); f. Copper Liquor, Inc. v.
Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975).
162. Justice Fortas noted that Schwinn was neither a newcomer nor a failing company.
388 U.S. at 374. Although no case since Schwinn has sustained such a defense, it has been
noted by lower courts. See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1004
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tions,' 63 and the claim that the manufacturer has retained all indicia of
ownership.t'* Another area not resolved was that of vertical restrictions
employed in patent, trademark, and know-how licensing in which the
licensee engages in the manufacture of the product rather than the mere
resale of the product.165 While Schwinn addressed itself to vertical ter-
ritorial and customer sales restrictions, it did not discuss less restrictive
alternatives 166 that also limit intrabrand competition to certain extents.
Lower courts have continued to recognize their validity and have nor-
maly applied a rule of reason approach in their analysis.167
C Sylvania
The latest case concerning vertical restrictions to reach the United
States Supreme Court is Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.' 68
Sylvania, a manufacturer and seller of television sets, was prompted in
1962 by a steep decline of its market share of national television sales to
adopt a franchise system of distribution. Chosen with the acknowledged
purpose of attracting more agressive and competent retailers, Sylvania's
franchise agreement included a location restriction 69 which in effect
protected the retailers by ensuring that their competitive efforts would be
expended against interbrand rather than intrabrand competitors. Al-
though the franchise system spaced the dealers to allow them some "el-
bow room," the arrangement was not an exclusive territory and Sylvania
reserved the right to increase the number of retailers in any given area as
it saw fit. No other territorial or customer limitations were imposed
upon the retailers. 170
n.41 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 943-
45 (5th Cir. 1975).
163. Compare Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
831 (1970) with Clairol, Inc. v. Cosmetics Plus, 325 A.2d 505 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1974).
164. See American Oil Co. v. McMullin, 508 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1975).
165. See generally MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 17-20. The Court in Schwinn specifi-
cally noted that it did not have the case of a patentee before it to make such a decision.
388 U.S. at 379 n.6.
166. Such less restrictive alternatives include exclusive distributorships, location
clauses, areas of primary responsibility, and profit pass-over arrangements. See notes 96,
98-100, supra. See generally MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 20-25.
167. See, e.g., Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1975).
168. 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
169. A location clause requires that the franchisee only sell the manufacturer's products
from a specified location or locations. A franchisee can sell to whomever he wants wher-
ever that customer is located as long as the retailer sells from the franchised location. See
notes 96, 98-100, supra, and accompanying text.
170. The revised plan appeared to have worked, for by 1965 Sylvania's market share
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The original Sylvania case' 7 ' was the result of a rupture of one of
these franchise agreements.172 Antitrust laws 173 were invoked when the
legality of the location restrictions was challenged during cross-claims in
that litigation. The present controversy, concerning the proper standard
for evaluating the vertical restriction's legality, arose when the district
judge refused to instruct the jury that the location restrictions were ille-
gal only if they unreasonably restrained competition. Instead, the court,
apparently in reliance upon a literal interpretation of the Schwinn
rule, 174 gave an instruction that amounted to a per se test, whereby the
jury found that Sylvania had engaged in a "restraint of trade in violation
of the antitrust laws with respect to location restrictions alone.' 75 On
appeal, the court of appeals reversed, 176 concluding that Schwinn was
distinguishable upon several grounds 177 and that an instruction incorpo-
rating the rule of reason should have been given to the jury. 178
The Supreme Court, although affirming' 79 the decision of the court
had increased from 1-2% to approximately 5% and Sylvania was ranked as the eighth larg-
est manufacturer of television sets. 97 S. Ct. at 2552.
171. GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 1974 Trade Cas. No. 75,072 (9th Cir.
1974).
172. Briefly, Sylvania decided to grant another franchise in the San Francisco area
already occupied by Continental. When Sylvania persisted in opening a new location,
Continental cancelled a large order. During this period Continental asked to be allowed
to open another location in Sacramento. When the request was denied, Continental, in
defiance of Sylvania, went ahead and opened the new location. Sylvania's credit depart-
ment reduced Continental's line of credit from $300,000 to $50,000. Continental then
withheld all payments owed Maguire, the finance company handling the credit arrange-
ment between Sylvania and its retailers. Upon nonpayment Maguire instituted suit, repos-
sessed the Sylvania merchandise and attached Continental's places of business and their
bank accounts. Finally Sylvania notified Continental that its franchise was terminated.
For a full discussion, see Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 982-85
(9th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
173. Continental claimed that Sylvania had violated section I of the Sherman Act by
entering into and enforcing franchise agreements that prohibited the sale of Sylvania prod-
ucts other than from specified locations. 97 S. Ct. at 2553.
174. 537 F.2d at 989-90.
175. 97 S. Ct. at 2553.
176. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976) (en
banc).
177. The court reviewed the nature and form of the restrictions, their competitive ef-
fects, and the market shares of Schwinn and Sylvania to conclude that location restrictions
should be viewed under a rule of reason approach since such restrictions could produce
desirable, pro-competitive effects wholly different from those restrictions sought to be pro-
hibited by Schwinn. Id. at 990-92.
178. Id. at 1002.
179. 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
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of appeals, differed drastically in its reasoning. The Court noted that
"[iln intent and competitive impact, the retail customer restriction in
Schwinn is indistinguishable from the location restriction"18 0  in
Sylvania and that in looking to substance rather than form, "the fact that
one restriction was addressed to territory and the other to customers is
irrelevant to functional anti-trust 'analysis."''s  Although the majority
found that Schwinn could not be distinguished, they noted that there was
a sufficient need for clarification of the law surrounding vertical restric-
tions to reconsider Schwinn in spite of the principle of stare decisis.
I8 2
After reviewing the Schwinn rule in light of the traditional meaning of
the per se rule and rule of reason tests, ' 8 3 and in terms of economic anal-
ysis of vertical restrictions, the Court found that applying different rules
to sale and nonsale transactions was unwarranted. From this, the Court
was left with the alternative either to expand Schwinn to include nonsale
transactions, or to abandon it in favor of a rule of reason approach to all
vertical restrictions. Unable to find any persuasive support for ex-
panding Schwinn, and finding that location restrictions did not have
such a "pernicious effect on competition" and did not "lack .. .any
redeeming virtue," the Court concluded that the per se rule of Schwinn
must be overruled.18 4
Future Implications of Sylvania
Initially it must be noted that with one exception practitioners are
basically back to where they started before the trilogy of White Motor,
Schwinn and Sylvania. Whereas before White Motor the government
had taken the position that vertical restrictions were per se illegal,185
now the applicable standard will be the rule of reason. Little judicial
direction has been provided by these cases concerning the economic cri-
teria to be used in deciding whether a restriction poses an unreasonable
restraint on competition.' 8 6 While White Motor could not be decided
180. Id. at 2556.
181. Id.
182. The Court acknowledged the great weight of scholarly opinion critical of Schwinn
and that a number of federal courts had consistently sought to limit Schwinn'r reach. Id
As one commentator has observed, the courts "have struggled to distinguish or limit
Schwinn in ways that are a tribute to judicial ingenuity." Robinson, Recent Antitrust De-
velopment; 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 272 (1975).
183. See text at notes 51 and 53, supra.
184. 97 S. Ct. at 2562.
185. See note 123, supra, and accompanying text.
186. See notes 48-52, supra, and accompanying text.
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due to lack of economic analysis of vertical restrictions,18 7 the Court in
Schwinn had before it an elaborately developed analysis1 88 but ignored
it to choose a sweeping per se rule based upon the "ancient rule against
restraints on alienation."' 89  Sylvania presented a situation that was
clearly within the Schwinn prohibition, 90 but the Court there chose to
overrule Schwinn because vertical restrictions did not meet the per se
standard.191 Although Sylvania did not make vertical restrictions legal,
it did establish the rule of reason as the standard to be applied in future
cases. Furthermore, while the Court did "not foreclose the possibility
that particular applications of vertical restrictions might justify per se
prohibition,"'192 the majority opinion made it "clear that departure from
the rule of reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic
effect."' 19 3 The practitioner now knows what standard will be applied,
but very little of the content of that standard.
In analyzing the Sylvania opinion, one has the impression that the
majority went out of its way to overrule Schwinn and to reestablish the
rule of reason approach in testing vertical restrictions. As Justice White
noted in his concurring opinion,' 94 the Court could have just as easily
adopted the lower court's distinction between the effects of the restric-
tions' 9 5 in Schwinn and Sylvania without overruling Schwinn entirely.
Apparently swayed by the great weight of scholarly authority critical' 96
of Schwinn and repeated attempts by lower federal courts to limit
Schwinn, 197 the Court was convinced that there was a sufficient need for
clarification of the entire area of vertical restrictions to justify reconsider-
187. See notes 130-33, supra, and accompanying text.
188. See text at note 143, supra.
189. 388 U.S. at 380.
190. Sylvania did not dispute the fact that title to the televisions passed to Continental.
97 S. Ct. at 2555.
191. See text at note 54, supra.
192. 97 S. Ct. at 2562.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2563-66.
195. It was argued that Schwinn involved a restriction on the locations and types of
permissible vendees, while Sylvania only imposed restrictions on the permissible locations
of vendors. In Schwinn, the restrictions wholly destroyed intrabrand competition by fore-
closing the distributor from selling to any purchaser located outside his exclusive territory.
However, in Sylvania intrabrand competition was preserved since Sylvania franchised at
least two dealers in the area and each dealer was free to sell to any buyer he chose. An-
other distinction argued was that Schwinn had an extremely large market share and could
use its market power to impose restraints whereas Sylvania's market share was so small
that it was threatened with expulsion from the market. 537 F.2d at 990-92.




ing' 9 8 rather than differentiating Schwinn. While recognizing the im-
portance of the principle of stare decisis, 199 the Court easily dismissed it
by quoting Justice Frankfurter's statement in Helvering v. Hallock
2°°
that "stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula
of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable,
when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more em-
bracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience." 20 1
Although this justification would suffice at times, it is hard to apply to
the Court's conclusion "that the appropriate decision is to return to the
rule of reason that governed vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn. ' 20 2
The rule of reason referred to is either one developed through its
application in conjunction with vertical restrictions, or a general rule of
reason developed from the overall antitrust body of law. Prior to
Schwinn, the only case dealing with vertical restrictions to reach the
Supreme Court had been White Motor. However, that case did not
clearly advocate one particular test, much less define the limits of the
rule of reason.20 3 In addition, very little guidance can be gleaned from
private antitrust litigation during that period because most cases ended
in consent decrees. 2° 4 Even these decrees are of little help since the gov-
ernment was insisting that vertical restrictions were to be tested under
the per se standard. Therefore, at least in regard to the realm of vertical
restrictions, it is difficult to believe that this was the "prior doctrine more
embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder and verified by experi-
ence" 20 5 that the Court looked to in overcoming stare decisis.
The standard to be applied must therefore have come from the gen-
eral rule of reason probably best articulated by Justice Brandeis in Chi-
cago Board of Trade.2° 6 However, while this formulation of the rule
may be more "embracing," it is questionable whether it can be termed
"intrinsically sounder" or "verified by experience." Rather than pro-
viding specific criteria, the Chicago Board of Trade test speaks in gen-
eralities of the "purposes" and "effects" of the restraint, industry
198. Id. at 2556.
199. Id. at 2562 n.30.
200. 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
201. Id. at 119, quoted in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2562
n.30 (1977).
202. 97 S. Ct. at 2562 (emphasis added).
203. See text at notes 130-33, supra.
204. See note 123, supra.
205. 309 U.S. at 119.
206. See text at note 51, supra.
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"conditions," and "facts peculiar to the business. '20 7 With such open-
ended and nebulous limits, such a standard could scarcely be "verified
by experience." In general, as one commentator has recently stated:
"The content of the Rule of Reason is largely unknown; in practice, it is
little more than a euphemism for nonliability. '20 8
Despite the difficulty in understanding this formulation of the
standard, the Court in Sylvania has firmly established the rule of reason
as the correct standard to be applied. Therefore, the criteria used in this
expression of the rule as well as other economic criteria must be re-
viewed to determine possible avenues for future expansion.
Although published prior to the Supreme Court decision in
Sylvania, a recent American Bar Association Monograph 20 9 has at-
tempted to discuss how Justice Brandeis' formulation of the rule of rea-
son might be applied to vertical distribution cases.2 10 The Monograph
lists the relevant question concerning the purpose of the restraint as
whether the restraint was ancillary to a legitimate business purpose or
was anti-competitive in purpose. In evaluating whether a restraint was
reasonably necessary to accomplish the legitimate purpose, the publica-
tion notes that such factors as "[t]he degree of consumer acceptance of
the product, the physical characteristics of the product and any unique
marketing problems involved, the duration and scope of the intrabrand
restraint, the strength of interbrand competition, and the acceptability of
less restrictive alternatives might all be relevant" 21' to the inquiry. In
measuring the significance of the effects of an intrabrand restraint upon
overall competition, the market power, as a function of the market share
and product differentiation, must be assessed. These factors, in turn,
would directly relate to the effectiveness of interbrand competition by
minimizing the effects of the restraint on intrabrand competition. 21 2
The major pro-competitive effects and justifications noted are maximiz-
ing market penetration; stimulating distributor service and other activity;
obtaining a market presence; facilitating entry by other products; and
strengthening economic concentration and the small business defense. 213
Recently, two possible approaches to make the rule of reason a
more workable standard in cases involving restrictions on distribution
207. Id.
208. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reection on the Sylvania
Decision, 45 CH. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977).
209. MONOGRAPH, supra note 4.
210. Id. at 55-71.
211. Id. at 57.
212. Id. at 62-67.
213. Id. at 67-70.
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have been suggested 214 to the courts. The first, also developed from the
Chicago Board of Trade formulation, requires the court to balance the
restriction's effects on the reduction in intrabrand competition against
the increase in interbrand competition. Although this balancing ap-
proach directs the focus of the court to the competitiveness 21 5 of the al-
leged restrictions and eliminates unrelated criteria, the opposition argues
that competition should not be the exclusive determinant because it
eliminates inquiries into the efficiency increasing aspects of some re-
straints. 216 In addition, this approach would not alleviate the complex-
ity of the analysis nor the lengthy evaluation which would be required to
qualify the impact of the restraint on all aspects of competition.
The second approach would have the courts focus on the question
"whether the restriction is intended to cartelize distribution or, on the
contrary, to promote the manufacturer's own interests. ' 217 The goal of
this approach would be to condemn and to impose liability automati-
cally for those restrictions desired for monopolistic purposes.218 How-
ever, this approach would preclude liability if the manufacturer did not
have a large share or was not acting in conjunction with others to form a
cartel. A three-stage inquiry219 into the legality of the restrictions has
been developed by Professor Posner:
(1) Does the restriction embrace a sufficiently large enough por-
tion of the market to make cartelization a plausible motive? If
not, the restriction should be lawful.
(2) If the answer to question 1 is yes, do dealers in the product
provide any presale services? If not, the restriction should be
deemed unlawful. 220
(3) If both answers to questions 1 and 2 are yes, did the manufac-
turer's output increase or decrease after imposing the restric-
214. Posner, supra note 208.
215. The decisional process the court would have to go through would require great
skill in economic facts and theories, and would at least, be a difficult prospect. However, it
would include: (I) determining what difference product differentiation, market concentra-
tion, exclusive dealing arrangements, entry barriers and other structures and conduct make,
and then looking for particular anti-competitive effects in the market; (2) determining what
justifications are possible for the practice; (3) applying the facts of the case to determine if
theoretical justifications apply; and (4) balancing the justifications against the potential for
competitive harm. Strasser, supra note 59, at 832.
216. Posner, supra note 208, at 14-17.
217. According to Professor Posner, this would be the superior approach. Id. at 17.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 19.
220. At this stage, Professor Posner suggested an alternative might be to shift the bur-
den of justification to the defendant. Id.
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tion? If it increased, the burden would shift to the government
to show that it increased for reasons unrelated to the restric-
tion. If output decreased, the restriction should be unlawful,
unless the defendent can prove that he intended to increase his
output by adopting the restriction. 22'
A third possible approach,222 referred to as a "more structured" 223
rule of reason, attempts to provide the court with criteria that the court
could use in evaluating the restraints according to the legitimate needs of
the distribution system, their justifications, and their entry barring and
interdependent pricing potential.224 The factors to be considered in this
approach include the existence of effective interbrand competition, 225 the
industry concentration level, the existence of product differentiation, 226
the existence of barriers to entry, promotion of newcomers and new
products, and the existence of exclusive dealing requirements.227 As
with any adequately definable set of criteria, the advantage would be in
relieving the judiciary from becoming economic theorists whenever they
had a case dealing with vertical restriction. When most economists can-
not agree upon one set of criteria that would address every aspect of the
problem, it will be interesting to see how the judiciary can provide one.
Another possible rule that the courts could use in making this area
more manageable, one that straddles the rule of reason and the per se
test, is the rule of presumptive illegality. 228 Under this rule, certain re-
straints, because of their greater likelihood of producing anti-competitive
effects, would be presumed illegal. However, this presumption would
not be irrebuttable as in a per se analysis, but would only shift the bur-
den to the manufacturer to justify the restraint. Certain defenses would
be allowed, but unless the presumption was rebutted the restraint would
be illegal regardless of its method of imposition.229 However, if manu-
facturers can defend such restraints by alleging that they create efficien-
221. Id.
222. Strasser, supra note 59, at 830-40.
223. Id. at 834.
224. Id. at 838.
225. To determine if interbrand competition exists, the court should focus on such fac-
tors as the cross elasticity of demand, profit ratios, the innovation and progress in the in-
dustry, and the presence or absence of overall efficiencies in the industry. Id. at 834-35.
226. The issue here would be whether product differentiation is based on image adver-
tising, or on product quality, function, service, or price. Id. at 836-37.
227. The existence of exclusive dealing arrangements in combination with the vertical
territorial restraints would make the system suspect. Id. at 838.
228. See generally MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 51-52; Strasser, supra note 59, at 833-
34.
229. Strasser, supra note 59, at 833.
1978] 1053
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
cies or other similar pro-competitive effects, the goal of judicial economy
is not advanced because a full trial of those issues would still be required
involving all the complexities discussed above. Whether this remains a
useful alternative is doubtful; 230 the presumptive illegality rule would
probably be of greater use if used in conjunction with one of the other
approaches.
As can be seen from the above approaches and as emphasized in
Sylvania, economic analysis will be increasingly important in future
cases. As stated by the Court in Sylvania, "competitive economics have
social and political as well as economic advantages, but an antitrust pol-
icy divorced from market considerations would lack any objective
benchmarks" 231 and any "departure from the rule of reason must be
based upon demonstrable economic effect."' 232 Exactly what economic
approach the lower federal courts will take in analyzing "market consid-
erations" to provide "objective benchmarks" remains to be seen. One
possible direction for the court to take comes from Professor Posner,
who, as pointed out in Justice White's concurring opinion, 233 was cited
five times by the majority when analyzing vertical restrictions. Posner
would read the two above quoted statements as "implying that antitrust
prohibitions must have an economic rationale and that the aesthetic de-
lights of smallness and the yearning to resurrect a nation of sturdy Jeffer-
sonian yeomen will not be permitted to decide antitrust cases."'234
Whether the court will eventually agree with Professor Posner and the
other members of the "Chicago School" of economic thought who argue
that economic efficiency is the only goal of antitrust law,2 35 or whether
the court will advocate a different approach is difficult to predict.
Conclusion
With the decision in Sylvania, the rule of reason has been firmly
established as the proper approach to take in analyzing vertical distribu-
tion arrangements. Economics should assume a prominent role in fu-
ture determinations because of the emphasis placed on it by the Supreme
Court in Sylvania. At present, the major drawback in this area is the
lack of agreement among economists and jurists over which economic
230. MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 52. This approach was rejected in Schwinn. Id. at
51.
231. 97 S. Ct. at 2559-60 n.21.
232. Id. at 2562.
233. Id. at 2568.




criteria to use. After only a brief review of the area, it is easy to see how
difficult and complex the questions become with even the most minor
restraint. Before addressing any issue in the area of vertical restrictions,
the practitioner should be thoroughly familiar with the basic concepts
and terminology used in this area. As long as the practitioner under-
stands those concepts, he should be able to address distribution problems
adequately.
Homer Doster Melton III
